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Protection of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees*
JOHN L. CARMICHAEL,

JR.

University of Alabama in B-irmingham
Congress, almost from the beginning, has exercised its right to investigate . 1
It was Woodrow Wilson who described the "informing" function of Congress
as more important than its legislative function .2 Although nowhere does the
Constitution grant to Congress an explicit right to investigate , the power has
been found as an "inh erent right " in Congress to carry out its law-making
function. 3 Th e incidence of congressional investigations has varied throughout United Stat es history ; three examples of heightened activity are the
loyalty security investigations of the 1950s and more recently the Watergate
probe into activities surrounding the 1972 presidential campaign and inquiry
into activities of United States intelligence agencies.
Aside from th e substance of inquiry , one of the most serious and controversial issues associated with congressiona l investigations has been the subjec t of
the rights of witnesses. Congressional investigating committees are not cour ts
of law, of course, but when they engage in the examination of witnesses the
proceedings may have serious consequences for those questioned. This study
will focus on proposals to protect the rights of witnesses and will examine the
practic es of the following congressio nal committees in protecting the rights of
witnesses: the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
(Watergate ), th e Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee on Government Operations (formerly the " McCarthy Committee" in the 1950s), the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Op era tions with Respect to IntelJigence Activities , and the House Select
Committee on Intelligence.
Many proposals for reform have focused on the alleged need to increase the
numb er and scope of tl1e mies shielding witnesses from mistreatment by
investigating committees. A word of caution should be expressed, however,
against depend ence entirely upon rules to provide tl1e safeguards. One writer
has argued that no matter how worthy the promulgation of rules may be, th eir
imposition may be like advocating that we treat the symptoms of the disease
rather than th e disease itself. The major problem , he insists, has occurred

* Supported by a University College Faculty Research Grant
1

The first congressional investigation was in 1972 by the Hous e of Repr esentativ es into th e
defeat of General Arthur St. Clair's American troops by Indians in the Ohio territory .
2
W. Wilson, Congressional Government 303 (1885).
3
S. Friedelbaum, Contemporary Constitutional Law 332 (1972).
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when committees have strayed from their legitimate purposes. 4 In a similar
view, George Galloway , writing in 1951 when he was Senior Specialist in
American government in the Libraiy of Congress , suggested that fairness for
witnesses could not be assured by judicial decisions , statutes , or procedural
rules . Any solution to the problem would depend on a sense of responsibility
on the part of investigators and an aroused public opinion serving as a check on
abuses by the committee itself. 5 It is interesting to note that his comments
were made just prior to the well-publicized investigations of the McCarthy
era.
A strong argument can be made , however, that some rules , whether
imposed by Congress , adopted voluntarily by committees , or established by
act of Congress , are necessary to protect the rights of witnesses. There may
well be some limit , on the other hand , to the number of rules that can be
effective in protecting these rights. The late Senator Estes Kefauver proposed
a relatively short list of rules which required , among other things , that timely
written notice of meetings be given, that the subject and scope of committee
heai·ings be made clear, and that persons injured by accusations be given the
right of effective rebuttal. 6 Committee rules adopted subsequently to his
recommendations have characteristically included the above mentioned protections.
Telford Taylor , in his book The Grand Inquest , written just after the
conclusion of the Senate McCarthy hearings, noted that witnesses at that time
had almost no rules for their protection . A witness had "no guide otl1er than
what he can learn regarding the committee's current attitudes and practices. " 7
Nevertheless , Taylor 's list of rules would be limited to the following , which he
believed would be simple and easy to enforce. The witnesses should have 1)
the right to counsel, 2) reasonable notice for his appearance before the
committee and statement by the committee as to the subjects on which he will
be questioned , 3) the right to make a statement , and 4) the privilege to have
access to the record of his testimony. Taylor was skeptical of attempts at
reform beyond the adoption of these few basic changes. 8
Although the central focus of this article will be upon the need for effective
procedural rules for congressional investigating committees, it should not
overlook the contribution the courts have made in establishing restrictions on
these committees and strengthening the protection afforded witnesses. The
courts have intervened witl1 vruying frequency over time into the activity of
investigating committees; at times they have appeai·ed lenient and at other
Chase , "Improving Congr essional Investigations ," 30 Temp . L. Q. 126, 154 (1957).
Galloway, "Congressional Inv estigations : Proposed Reforms ," 18 U.Chi .L.R ev. 478 , 494-95
(1951).
6 Kefauver , "Cod e of Conduct for Congressional Investigations ," 8 Ark.L.R ev. 369, 374-75
(1954).
7
T. Taylor , Grand Inqu est 242 (1955).
8 Id . at 254.
4
5
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times strict. Nevertheless , some basic rules and limitations have emerged.

The Federal Courts and Congressional Investigations
Very early, the United States Supreme Court , in an effort to protect
, itnesses and to prevent inquiries which seek to conduct "fishing" expeditions has required that authorizing resolutions of congressional committees
indicate a legislative purpose and that there be an explicit delegation of
authority from the house to the committees to investigate specific subject
matter. In Kilbourn v. Thompson 9 the Supreme Court overturned a conviction for contempt of a witness who refused to answer questions before an
investigating committee of the House of Representatives. The Court held that
the House had exceeded its powers by empowering one of its committees to
make the investigation. Part of the Court's objection was on the grounds of a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine; the proceedings were being
handled by the federal courts and the committee was usurpingjudicial power.
In addition, the Court ruled that Congress could not inquire into the completely personal affairs of individuals. Investigations must relate to some valid
legislative purpose.
However , the Court retreated somewhat when in In re Chapman 10 it
established a presumption in favor of a valid legislative purpose on the part of
Congress. The Court ruled that it was not necessary for the Senate to say in
advance what legislation it proposed to enact.
In Sinclair v. United States, 11 a case growing out of the Teapot Dome
inquiry , the Court upheld the right of the Senate to hold the witness in
contempt for refusal to disclose certain information because allegedly it related to his private affairs and, in any event, pertained to matters before the
courts. The committee was justified in compelling this testimony in exercise of
its legislative powers and it had the right to conduct the investigation even
though information sought might be used by the courts.
In the period between this case and Watkins v. United States, 12 there was
little interference by the Supreme Court in the activities of investigating
committees. 13 This was particularly true with respect to investigations by the
9

103 U.S. 168 (1881).
166 U.S. 661 (1897).
11
279 U.S. 263 (1929).
12
354 U.S. 178 (1957).
13
Ther e were a few notable exceptions. Among them was United States v. Rumely , 345 U.S.
41 (1953). One question was whether the information sought went beyond the scope of the
authorizing resolution creating the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, empowering it to investigate , among other matters , "all lobbying activities , intended to influence,
encourag e, promote , or retard legislation." At issue was the refusal by Rumely to disclose the
names of certain persons purchasing books of a political nature published by an organization
whose secre tary was Rumely. The Court avoided constitutional questions but reversed the
conviction for contempt on the ground that the information sought was outside the scope of the
authorizing resolution .
JO
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House Un-American Activities Committee in the 1940s and the 1950s and by
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Government Operations , then termed the McCarthy Committee . A change
occurred in 1957.
John T. Watkins, a labor union organizer, appeared as a witness before a
subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. He was
willing to answer questions about his relationship with the Communist Party
as well as questions about persons currently members of the Communist Party
but refused to answer questions about those persons he believed had left the
Party on the grounds that thes e questions were not germane to the work of the
committee. He was convicted of contempt of Congress under a statute which
made it a criminal offense to refuse to answer "any question pertinent to the
question under inquiry. " 14 The Supreme Court sustained his refusal to answer the questions on the ground that they were not pertinent to the inquiry.
The Court overturned his conviction as a violation of Due Process under the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. There was no opportunity for the
witness to judge whether he could afford not to answer because of the failure of
the authorizing resolution and remarks by the committee chairman and other
members of the committee to provide any satisfactory guide .
Although the Court did not base its holding on First Amendment grounds,
it did , by way of dicta , indicate that First Amendment rights might be invoked
and suggested that the Bill of Rights applies to congressional investigations.
The Court stated that "there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of
exposure. " 15
The Court has also protected witnesses by insisting that committees adhere
to the rules which they have adopted. A case in point is Yellin v. United
States. 16 The House Un-American Activities Committee was investigating
alleged Communist infiltration in the steel industry. Having information that
Yellin was a Communist , the committee decided to call him and question him
in public, rather than in executive session. (Yellin's attorney insisted that
questioning be in executive session. ) The staff director , contrary to his power
under the rules of the committee , denied, on his own authority , Yellin's
request . The Court decided that the witness was entitled to have the comm ittee follow its own rules of procedure , and since the committee had failed to do
so it reversed his conviction.
Recently , the Court has appeared more reluctant to intervene in suppor t of
the witness. In Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund 17 the Court
sustained a committee's subpoena powers under the Speech or Debate Clause
of the Constitution in tl1e face of an alleged violation of the witness' First
Amendment rights.
14

15

16
17

2 U.S. C. #192 (1938).
Watkins v . United States , 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).
374 U.S. 109 (1963).
421 U.S. 491 (1975).
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Analysis of Committee Rules and Practices Before Certain Committees
Although intervention by the courts has been important , the rules established by Congress for its investigating committee and the rules adopted by
the individual committees have been a crucial element in protecting rights of
witnesses. Rule XI 2(a) of the House of Representatives required that each
standing committee of the House adopt written rules which shall be published
in the Congressional Record. 18 Committee hearings must be open to the
public unless there is a vote within the committee, in open session with a
quorum present , to close them. 19 Each committee (except the Rules Committee ) must make public announcement of the date, place , and subject matter of
the committee's investigation one week prior to the commencement of the
hearing unless the committee deems it necessary to start earlier. 20 So far as
practicable each committee must require each witness to file with the committee, prior to the witness' appearance, a written copy of what he proposes to
say.21 Committees are required , for the purpose of taking testimony , to
establish a quorum not to be less than two members. 22
The Chairman must state , at the beginning of the hearing , the topic of the
inquiry and a copy of the committee rules must be made available to the
witness. The witness has the right to counsel. If the committee believes that
evidence to be received tends to "defame, degrade, or incriminate" a person it
shall take testimony in closed session, permit that person to appear , and
receive requests to subpoena additional witnesses. The committee shall make
a ailable to the witness a transcript of his testimony at public session , and in
private session when authorized by the committee. 23
The House Select Committee on Intelligence in its rules, adopted May ,
1975, accepted the House Rules except as otherwise provided in its own
rules. 24The Select Committee conformed to the minimal requirement for a
quorum when it provided that a quorum for taking testimony and receiving
evidence shall consist of two mem hers. 25Provisions with respect to closed and
open committee meetings agreed essentially with the provisions in House
Rule XI. The Select Committee's rules specifically prohibited direct and
cross-examination by witness' counsel although no specific prohibition is
contained in House Rule XI. 26 All members of the Select Committee had five
minutes each to interrogate witnesses until all had done so, and thereafter ,
additional time at the discretion of the Chairman. 27Thus, all members of the
18

18
20
21
22
23

24
25

26
27

See Rules of the House of Repr esentatives, 94th Cong ., 1st Sess. (Revised June 16, 1975).
Rule Xl 2 (g) (2).
Rule Xl 2 (g) (3).
Rule XI 2 (g) (-l).
Rule XI 2 (h).
Rule XI 2 (k).
Rule 1, Hous e Select Committe e on Intelligence (Adopted May 21, 1975).
Rule 2(5).
Rule 4(1).
Rule 4(8).
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committee , majority as well as minority, had the opportunity to question,
allowing presumably varying viewponts to be presented in the questioning
and perhaps assuring that witnesses will have "friendly " as well as "adverse"
questioning. Supplemental views of individual committee members , in addi tion to the final report of the committee , could be filed. 28
Representative Otis G. Pike , Chairman of the House Select Committee,
described the rights of witnesses as being well protected during the hearings .29 Staff members could take testimony in executive session but this
testimony could not be placed in the committee's record unless the full
committee voted to have it included therein. Witnesses were allowed to ask
questions themselves although this practice was not provided for in the
committee rules. There was no swearing of witnesses although any depositions were taken under oath. An attempt was made to keep the hearings public
as much as possible. Media coverage of committee hearings in public session
was permitted ; however , if a witness objected to the presence of television
cameras , his interrogation was held in executive session at his request. No
witness was prosecuted for contempt since no citation for contempt was
approved by the full House. 30 The example of this committee demonstrates
that a great deal depends upon the attitudes of th e committee chairman and a
desire to treat witnesses fairly .
Senate standing , select , or special committees are governed by certain
rules, most of them contained in Title 2 of the United States Code , Sections
190-194. The committees must publicly state the date , location , and subject
matter of any hearing one week in advance unless th e committee decides
there is reason to begin the hearing earlier. 31 Meetings of all committees,
except Appropriations , must be open to the public unless the testimony
involves national security matters , adversely affect the character or reputation
of an individual or may disclose confidential information protected by law. 32 A
wih1ess is required to file in writing a statement of proposed testimony at least
one day prior to his testimony unless waived by the committee .33 No witness
can refuse to testify on the grounds that he will be disgraced before the
committe e. 34 A refusal to testify or answer a question pertinent to the hearing
will make the witness guilty of a misdemeanor . 35 Finally , each committee
28

Rule 8(1).
Int erview with Repr esentativ e Otis G. Pike ( Y) in Washington , D.C. , March 25, 1976.
30
nd er an act of Congr ess, originall y passed in 1857, 18 U.S .C. #401 (1958), the committee
must recomm end to the par ent body which must vote the cont empt citation. It is then sent to the
Unit ed States distri ct attorn ey who pr esents the matt er to a federal grand jury. If an indictment is
forthcoming it is tried in a federal district court and then may be app ealed up to the Supreme
Court . See C . Pritch ett , Th e Am erican Constituti .011217 (2d ed ., 1968).
3 1 2 U.S .C. 190a-l (a) (1970).
32 2 U.S .C. 190a-l(b ) (1970).
33 2 U.S.C . 190a-l (c) (1970).
3 4 2 U.S.C. 193 (1938).
3 5 2 U.S .C . 192 (1938).
29
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must adopt rul es consistent with th e Standin g Rules of th e Senat e and publish
them in th e Congressional Record . 36
A standin g committ ee of th e Senat e, with perhap s th e broad est mandat e for
investigation, is th e Senate Pern,an ent Sub committ ee on In ves tigations of th e
Committ ee on Governm ent Op eration s. Among other matt ers, th e sub committ ee is empow ered to inv estigat e th e "e fficiency and economy of operations
of all bran ches of the Governm ent ," 37 criminal or improp er activiti es in th e
field of labor -man age ment relation s, 38 th e energy probl em, 3 9 and int ergovernm ental relation s betwee n th e Unit ed Stat es, stat e, and local gove rnment s. 40
The rul es of th e Senat e Perman ent Sub committ ee on In vestigations are
fairly detailed and specific. Subpo enas for th e att endanc e of witn esses and th e
produ ction of mat erial may be issued by th e sub committ ee chairman or any
memb er of th e committ ee designat ed by him .41 For administ erin g oaths to
witn esses and th e taking of testimony , one memb er of th e subcommitt ee, with
permission of th e chairman and th e rankin g minority m emb er, can constitut e
a quorum . 42 Thi s contrasts with Rule XI (2) 01) of th e House of Repr ese ntativ es
which requir es a minimum of tv,o memb ers for receiving evidence and taking
testimony. 43
One possible criti cism of th e rul es of this subcommitt ee is th e fact that th e
chairman of th e sub committ ee can issue subpo enas without polling th e entir e
committ ee. Minority couns el for th e committ ee has bee n parti cularl y d esirou s
of having an agree ment that th e minority be consult ed before issuance.
Senator Ch arles H . Percy (Ill. ), rankin g minority memb er , secur ed a commitment by lett er from Senator H enry M . Jackson (Wash .) of th e majority ,
that th e rankin g minorit y memb er would be consult ed before issuance of
subpo enas. 44 Thi s requir ement of greater cons ensus by committ ee memb ers
seems to be a reason able pr erequisit e which should militat e against a larg e
numb er of subp oe nas dir ected at witn esses.
The Senate Select Committ ee on Pr esidenti al Campai gn Activities (Wat ergate) wa established und er Senate Resolution 60. 45 Amon g oth er thin gs, th e
re elution permitt ed th e committ ee to issue subpo enas throu gh its chairman
or anyone designated by him .46 For th e purpos es of takin g testim ony, th e
36

2 U.S.C. 190a-2 (1970).
See S. Res. 49, 94th Co ng., 1st Sess . (1975). Sec. 4(a) (1).
Sec. 4(a) (2).
39 Sec . 4(a) (7).
40
Sec. 5.
41
Rules of Proce dur e for th e Senate Pe rm anent Sub committ ee on In vestigations of th e
Committee on Gove rnm ent Op erations (Adopt ed March 3, 1976), Rule 2.
42
Rule 5.
43
See Rules of the House of Represe nt atives , 94th Cong. , 1st Sess . (Revised June 16, 1975).
44
Interview with Mr. Robe rt Sloan, Co unsel, Perm anent Subcommitt ee on Investigations, in
Washington, D .C ., March 23, 1976.
45
93rd Cong ., 1st Sess . (1973).
46
Sec. 3(b).
37

38
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committee might set a quorum of less than a majority of the members and the
committee could hold hearings at any time or place determined by it. 47 The
resolution permitted the committee to adopt its own rules of procedure. 48
The rules adopted by the committee were the most detailed of any of the
congressional investigation committees to date. These rules provided that
subpoenas of witnesses would occur at a "reasonably sufficient time " prior to
the hearing. 49 All witnesses must be furnished a copy of the commi ttee
rules. 50 Questioning of witnes ·es was limited to committee members or
authorized staff members. 51 In addition a witness had the right to counse l wbo
could request the testimony of other witnesses or the introduction of other
evidence. 52 Although there was no right of direct or cross-examination by
witness' counsel, counsel might prepare in writing questions to be asked of a
witness. 53 Also, any person subject to investigation in public hearing might
submit in writing to the committee chairman questions for cross-exam ination . 54
Any person who believed that testimony would adversely affect his reputation could request to appear personally before the committee or file a sworn
statement relevant to the adverse testimony. 55 o testimony in executive
session was to be made available to any other person except commi ttee
members and staff. 56 Any evid nee in executive session which the commi ttee
decided might "defame , degrad , or incriminate a person " would not be
introduced in public hearing unless that person was given an opportunity to
rebut it. 57 A witness had the right to see any h·anscript of his testimony prior to
it release . 58 Finally , any wih1ess might request , on the grounds of harassmentor physical discomfort , that no camera be directed at him during public
session. 59
Perhaps the most important failure to protect witnesses during the Watergate hearing was the problem of leaks. Several persons who were involved in
47
Secs. l (d) and 3(a) (2). Rul e XXV 5(b) of the Standing Rul es of the Senate provides that eac h
standing commi tt ee or subcommittee thereof can set a number less than one third of its membership for taking sworn testimony.
48 Sec. l (c).
49 Rules of Procedure for the
enate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
(Adopted April 1973), Rule 11.
50 Rul e 13.
51 Rule 15.
52 Rul es 19 and 22.
53 Rul e 24.
54 Rule 25.
55 Rule 26.
56 Rule 27 .
57 Rul e 28.
58 Rul e 30.
59 Rul e 35.
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the investigation confirm ed this. 60 Th ere appeared to be a selective leaking of
information which became widespread. 61 Allege dly , man y of th e reco rds
subpoenaed by th e committ ee went beyond th e mandat e of th e committ ee.
There was a tend ency to beco me blind ed to th e rights of witnesses. 62 A
witness did not have th e right to review th e final report of th e committee
before release. 63 How eve r , on th e positiv e side th ere were pra ctic es which
prot ecte d witnesses by going beyond th e technical requir em ent s of the committ ee rules. Th ere was no effort by th e committee to hav e a witness who ,
pr ev iousl y having claimed th e Fifth Am e ndm e nt right against se lfincrimin ation in exec utiv e sessions , to claim it again in public session. 64 This
contrasted sharply with th e practic e of th e McCarthy committee in th e 1950s.
Also the Watergate committ ee mad e testimony in exec utiv e session available
at the committee 's expens e eve n though not provid ed in th e rul es. 65 Th e rul es
of the Watergate committee have b ee n describ ed as affording witn esses
greater protection than the rul es of other committees. 66
A recently concluded investigation was that of th e Senat e Select Committee
to Study Governmental Op era tions with Respect to Int elligenc e Activities.
The rules of this committee 67 rese mbl e th e rules of th e other committ ees
pr eviously discus sed.
A spec ial problem pos ed by this committee's investigation was that of the
identification of int elligenc e agency employ ees and their missions and th e
possible dan ge r pos ed to them . In one instanc e a name that would have bee n
included in th e "Assassination Report " was removed from th e docum ent after
a court suit was filed , but a Washington newspap er secured the nam e and
reported it anyv.,ay. Another probl em during th e investigation was th e question of deciding when it was incumb ent on th e committee to warn a witn ess
with respec t to claiming th e Fifth Amendm ent prot ection against incrimination. 68
80 Interv iew with Mr. Eiler C. Ravnh olt, Administrative Assistant to U.S. Senator D anie l K.
Inouye in Washington , D . C. , March 24, 1976 ; interview with Mr. Terry Lenzne r, form erly
Assistant Chief Counse l, Senat e Select Committee on Presidential Cam paign Activities , in
Washington , D.C. , March 31, 1976.
6 1 See F. Thomp on , At That Point in Time 55 (1975).
82
Int erview with Mr. Michael Madiga n, forme rly Assistant Min ority Cou nsel, Senate Select
Commi ttee on Pr esidential Campa ign Activities , in Washington , D .C. , 1arch 30 , 1976.
63 Int erview with Mr . Te rry Lenz ner , March 31, 1976.
64
Interview with Mr. Eiler C. Ravn holt, March 24, 1976.
65 Int erview with Mr . Terr y Lenzne r, March 3 1, 1976.
86
Int erview with Arthur S. Mill e r, Pr ofesso r of Law , ational Law Ce nt er, George
Washington Unive rsity; formerly Chief Co nsultant , Senate Select Committee on Pr es ide ntial
Campaign Activities , in Washington , D .C. March 23, 1976.
87
Rules of Procedure for th e Senate Select Comm ittee to Study Governmental Operations
with Resp ect to Int ellige nce Activities (As amended , September 22 , 1975).
88
Interview with Mr . Michae l Madiga n, Cou nsel, Senate Se! ct Committ ee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Int elligence Activities , in Washington , D .C., March 30 ,
1976.
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Minimal Standards for Committ ees of Congress
Sinc e th e rul es of proc edur e applicab le to committees of Congr ess are not to
be found in a single source but are contain ed in certain judicial dec isions , in
standing rul es of Congress, in rul es adopted by individual committees, and in
federal statutes, a strong argum ent can be mad e that certain minimal rules
should be establish ed by law applicable to all congressional inves tigations.
Th e Hous e , und er Rul e XI, has provid ed a se t of rul es applicable to House
Committees and the Senat e has certain rules set forth in its Standing Rules
and in Titl e 2 of the United Stat es Code. Th ere should be a law which would
es tablish minimal rules applicable to both Senat e and Hous e. Thi~ law shou ld
includ e th e following guarantees: 1) eac h committee must mak e public announc e ment of th e elate, plac e, and subject matter of th e inves tigation at leas t
one week prior to the commencement of the hear ing; 2) each witness shall be
served a copy of th e reso lution or statute es tablishing the committee and be
provid ed a set of the committee rul es prior to the hearing ;69 3) he shall have
the right to make a statement at th e beginning and conclusion of his tes timony;
4) he shall have th e right to counse l and the committee shall make an effort to
furnish him counse l if he is unabl e to do so; 5) witness' counsel shall have the
opportunity to submit in writing qu es tions to be asked of other witnesses ; 6)
subpoenas for th e app earanc e of witn esses can be mad e only by majority vote
of the entir e committee; 7) a pe rson not initially pr ese nt at the hearing must
hav e th e opportunity to appear or file a written sworn statement in rebuttal to
any adverse statement mad e about him ; 8) secrecy of tes timony in exec utive
session must be pr ese rved ; 9) individual committee members can review the
final report and issu e th eir own report if th ey disagr ee with it;70 10) comm ittees must adopt rul es and publish the m in th e Congr essional Record within
thirty days after th eir adoption.
Many of th ese rul es, applicab le to th eir resp ec tive committees, hav e been
adopted by th e Hous e and Senat e, have bee n adopted by congression al
committees th e mselves , or hav e bee n embodi ed in applicabl e law. In order to
promot e consist ency and assure minimal guarantees for all witn esses, how69 See Cou ncil of State Governments , Legis lati ve fll vestigations: A Surve y and Recom mendations (1968). This stud y proposes a Mode l Code of Fair Procedures which includes the following
rules: 1) Adequate notice shall be g.iven witnesses ; 2) service of subpoenas must be at least one
week in advance of th e hearing ; 3) th e person subpoenaed shall be se rved a copy of'th e resolution
or sta tut e establishing the commit tee , be provided a sta teme nt informing him of the subject
matter of the investigation , and be furnished a copy of' th rules under which th e com mittee
opera tes ; 4) he may have cou nsel of his own choosing who , in additi on to advising th e witness of his
right s, may submi t to the committ ee proposed questions to be asked relevan t to matters on which
th e wit ness may be ques tioned . In addition the witness may pr opou nd questions on his own. At
23-24. 1lowe ver, this last nam ed right might pro ve chaotic in the hearin g and th e author of this
articl e doubts that th e right should be includ ed. Ce rtrunly, if the commi ttee is willing to secu re
cou nse l for a witness unable to secure one for him se lf, his rights will be ad equa tely protected.
70
Mr. Rober t Sloan, Counse l, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on In ves tigations , argued
strongly for greater inpu t by the minority into th e final repo rt or as an alternative, th e right to file a
se parate report. Int erv iew , March 23, 1976.
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e\'er , a strong argument can be mad e for Congress to pass a law, applicable to
all congr essional committ ees, incorporating th ese basic rul es.
Additionally , it is reco mm end ed that th e "Office of Legislativ e H earing
Examiner" be created. 71 This would assur e a more expert approach to th e
questioning of witnesses. It would relieve Congr essm en of th e heavy responsibility th ey now have for conducting th e hearings in a fair and expeditious
mann er. Th e "Legislative H earing Examin er" would have a thorough knowledge of th e rul es applicable to the hearing and by training he would be bett er
equ ipp ed to perform his duti es than individual Congressmen. H e would be a
lawyer . Th e office would b e analogous to that of the Administrativ e Law Judg e
in the administrativ e agencies who hears testimony and makes decisions. ot
only would th e crea tion of this office assure more equitable trea tment of
witnesses, but it would also enable Congress to carry out its investigativ e
function more efficiently. The "Legislative H earing Examiner " should also
posses a well train ed staff to assist him in p erforming his duti es.
Another impro ve ment would be th e crea tion of a body in Congress to hear
comp laints of th e violation of committee rules. Since th e courts are reluctant
to interve ne in com mit ee pro cee dings , this would go a long way toward
affording protection to witnesses whose rights might have bee n abused. In
addition, Congress should consider passing a law that would p ermit a witness
who had been falsely accused in a proc eeding to institut e a civil suit in federal
court to secure damages against th e witness who falsely testifies. This would
provide a stron g incentive for witnesses to be truthful in th e testimony th ey
give.
Although th e rules establish ed for th e prot ection of a witness and th e
adh erence to them by th e committe e are important safeguards for th e rights of
a witness, it is still incu mb ent on counsel for th e witness to make good use of
the rules. In addition , th e committ ee chairman and committee members hav e
a responsibility to assure that staff members , in th e excitement of th e inves tigation, are not blinded to th e rights of witnesses. 72 In th e final analysis a great
deal depend s on th e sense of fairn ess of all concern ed , parti cularly th e
committ ee chairman, but also committ ee me mbers , the staffs of committees
and th e news media.
71
See Miller, "Imp lications of Watergate: Some Prop osals for Cu ttin g the Presidency Down
to Size," 2 f-last .L.Rev . 33 (1975). Professor Arthur S. Miller directs his at ten tion specifical ly to
the problem of Congress in checking the execu tive branch of governme nt bu t his comments are
equally app licable to ot her investiga tory functions of Congress. He proposes th e esta blishm en t of
the o!Hceof "legislative hearing exam iner" because , as he argues, no "sing le member of Co ngress
is expected to be knowledgeable on matters covering the entire execu tive branch (as well as
outside it) ... . " At 62.
72
Mr. Michael Madigan stressed th at attorneys for witnesses must be alert to their clients '
rights and believed that in the Watergate inves tigatio n there was a ten d ency of junior staff
members in th e excitement of the investigation, to encroac h on th e rights of witnesses. Int erview ,
~1arch 30, 1976.
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Conclusion
This article has reviewed proposals for improving th e rights of witnesses
before committees of Congress ; it has studied the role of the Supreme Court in
protecting these rights. In addition , it has examined the rules of four commi ttees of Congress relating to rights of witnesses and has proposed a set of rules
to be embodied in federal law, applicable to all committees of Congress. 73
These rules embody guarantees that will alleviate the need for intervention by
the courts. In the first place , the courts are reluctant to intervene ; second ly,
court proceedings are time-consuming and costly. Relieving the cour ts of the
burden of protecting witnesses will also enable the committees to pe1form
their tasks more efficiently and will bolster protection afforded witnesses.
Should Congress enact th e list of rules proposed in this article , they could
be modified in light of the experience of future committees as they conduc t
investigations. Congress and its committees in carrying out the investigative
function have come a long way in protecting witnesses ' rights; uniform rules
will further aid the process.
73 These rul es are intend ed to be miJ1imal ones and should not d etrac t from flexibility on the
part of committ ees of Congress which might want to adopt additional rules to fit th e particular
circumstances of the investigation.

